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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #8252-81
16 December 1981MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : [REDACTED] 25X1
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EESUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE
(Meeting on 15 December 1981 dealt exclusively with Poland)

1. Declaration of Martial Law: The Gdansk Solidarity meeting on 11-12 December was simply the pretext and tactical opportunity used by the government to implement a decision taken at least a week earlier. Although there was agreement that the Soviets had long been pressuring the Poles to act forcefully and were involved in martial law preparations, there was some division of opinion about the exact degree of Soviet complicity, their foreknowledge of events, and the degree of Soviet approval for some aspects of the clampdown (i.e., military government, ambiguous role of party, appeal to nationalism.)

2. Current Situation: The regime's atomization of the country has so far prevented the reorganization of Solidarity as an effective national entity but has not been able to block the reemergence of some local organs. Elements of virtually all Polish divisions are participating in the Martial Law actions. If faced with continued resistance and in particular the occupations of some enterprises, the regime will probably use force in some carefully selected locations. Further actions will be determined by the outcome of those initial probes.

3. Prospects: In the next one to two months possible outcomes range from a genuine regime-Solidarity accommodation to Soviet military intervention. The group consensus was there was a better than even chance that a public posture of reasonableness combined with the selective use of force would allow the regime to be able to reassert its authority and bring the country back under its control. However, analysts also felt that there was about a 25 to 30% possibility that the situation would deteriorate to the point that the Soviets would intervene militarily (the Strategic Warning Staff attached a 50% probability to this outcome). The least likely outcome is a genuine accommodation. In any event, further economic decline is almost certain.

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
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4. Soviet Military Intervention: To date there are no indications of Soviet military involvement or preparations for it. There were two views about the effect of the latest developments on our ability to provide warning of any impending Soviet actions:



B. There was a minority view that the imposition of martial law created the possibility for Soviet military intervention on a much lower scale (as low as five divisions) and carried out more gradually.



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